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Introduction
The existence of punishment where an individual
decreases both its own and the target’s immediate
payoffs (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995) has been a
key topic in the recent literature on human coopera-
tion. Humans readily use the option to punish cheat-
ers even in one-shot public good games (Fehr &
Ga¨chter 2002) or when they just observe transgres-
sions (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). In the experiments
on humans such punishment creates a public good,
because it causes punished individuals to behave
more cooperatively in the future with other partners
(Fehr & Ga¨chter 2002). Based on these results, the
cultural group selection concept (Boyd et al. 2003;
Gintis et al. 2003) has been developed, which states
that strong competition between human groups has
selected for culturally transmitted punishment as a
mechanism that benefits group survival. However,
the notion that punishment increases group produc-
tivity has been contested (Rockenbach & Milinski
2006; Dreber et al. 2008; Egas & Riedl 2008). It
seems that punishment can only be useful if it
involves relatively low costs to the punisher and a
high impact on the target (Egas & Riedl 2008) and if
the same partners have many interactions (Ga¨chter
et al. 2008).
The evolution of punishment may be easier to
understand in asymmetric games between two play-
ers where only one partner may cheat. For example,
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Abstract
The conditions under which humans benefit from contributing to a pub-
lic good have attracted great interest; in particular the potential role of
punishment of cheaters is hotly debated. In contrast, similar studies on
other animals are lacking. In this study, we describe for the first time
how the course of interactions between parasitic sabre-tooth blennies
(the cheaters) and their reef fish victims can be used to study both pun-
ishment and the emergence of public goods. Sabre tooth blennies
(Plagiotremus sp.) sneak up from behind to bite off small pieces of scales
and ⁄or mucus from other fish. Victims regularly show spontaneous
aggression as well as aggressive responses to blenny attacks. In a between
species comparison, we tested how the probability of chasing a blenny is
affected by (1) the option of avoiding interactions with a blenny by
avoiding its small territory, and (2) variation in local abundance of con-
specifics. We found that resident victim species are more aggressive
towards blennies than visiting species. This difference persisted when we
controlled for victim size and territoriality, suggesting that it is the
enforced repeated game structure that causes residents to chase blennies.
In residents, we also found a negative correlation between aggression
towards blennies and local abundance, which suggests that the benefits
of chasing are diluted with increasing local abundance. We discuss the
implication of these results for future studies.
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in cleaner fish–client reef fish interactions, cleaners
may cooperate by feeding on client ectoparasites and
cheat by eating client mucus, whereas non-preda-
tory clients lack the option to cheat cleaners (recent
review by Bshary & Coˆte´ 2008). Some client species
respond to cheating by cleaners with chasing, which
causes cleaners to behave more cooperatively during
future interactions with the punishing individuals
(Bshary & Grutter 2002, 2005). While the self-serv-
ing role of punishment has been demonstrated in
the cleaner fish system, the effects of punishment on
third party individuals have not been explored. For
example, punished individuals could be generally
more cooperative in future interactions. In that case,
the punishing individual would not only gain per-
sonal benefits but in addition produce a public good.
The scenario would then be similar to n-player coop-
eration games where the benefits resulting from a
contribution are so high that individual contribu-
tions become immanently self-serving: per unit
given the contributor receives more than one unit in
return, independently of what others are doing.
Such contributions to public goods could yield
immediate benefits, in which case the concept of
by-product mutualism (Brown 1983) applies. Alter-
natively, contributions could be self-serving even if
they are an investment (in the sense that the imme-
diate consequences are a reduction in payoffs for the
actor, Bshary & Bergmu¨ller 2008). Investment may
yield foreseeable future benefits if recipients will use
it for self-serving actions that benefit the investor as
a by-product. To such circumstances, the concept of
pseudoreciprocity (Connor 1986) applies. An alter-
native term in the literature describing self-serving
contributions to public goods is ‘weak altruism’ (Wil-
son 1990).
From a strategic point of view, it is easy to under-
stand that contributions to public goods are stable if
the contributions are self-serving. However, it is
important to identify the ecological conditions that
cause helping to be self-serving and thereby causing
the unconditional contributions (Nowak & May
1992; Van Baalen & Rand 1998; Killingback et al.
1999; Kokko & Johnstone 1999; Taylor & Irwin
2000; Avile´s 2002). Of particular importance has
been the concept of group augmentation (Kokko
et al. 2001), which was developed to understand
apparently unconditional helping in cooperatively
breeding species like meerkats Suricata suricatta (Clut-
ton-Brock et al. 1999, 2000; Clutton-Brock 2002).
Mutual dependency between group members (Rob-
erts 2005) causes conditions where helping can be
either a by-product mutualism or pseudoreciprocity.
Recently, Sherratt et al. (2009) developed a model
where they assumed that an individual gets a dispro-
portionate amount of the benefits derived from its
own contribution. Such asymmetry greatly enhances
stable contribution to a public good and may explain
for example the production of extra-cellular sub-
stances in bacteria (Griffin et al. 2004; Dugatkin
et al. 2005). Nevertheless, empirical studies on by-
product public goods that explicitly test theoretical
predictions and aim at identifying both ecological
parameters and game structures are a clear lack.
Here, we describe in detail the nature of interac-
tions in a system that appears to provide a setting
for detailed additional studies on punishment and
the possible emergence of public goods as a by-prod-
uct. Our study species are parasitic sabre-tooth blen-
nies, Plagiotremus rhinorhynchus and P. tapeinosoma,
and their victim coral reef fish species. Sabre-tooth
blennies defend small territories in which they attack
many different types of fish species and bite off small
chunks of skin, mucus and scales. This is their only
way of gaining food (Smith-Vaniz 1976). Plagiotremus
rhinorhynchus has attracted attention because it
shows variation in colour, with one morph closely
resembling juvenile cleaner wrasses (Kuwamura
1981; Coˆte´ & Cheney 2004, 2007; Moland & Jones
2004; Johnson & Hull 2006). To avoid possible
effects of such aggressive mimicry on our results, we
only included adult, non-mimetic blennies in our
study. For our game theoretic approach, sabre-tooth
blennies are the equivalent of ‘phenotypic defectors’
(Sherratt & Roberts 2001) or ‘always defect players’
(Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) in terminology used to
evaluate the stability of cooperation. We noticed
during preliminary observations that host fishes
sometimes show spontaneous aggression as well as
aggressive responses to successful and attempted
blenny attacks. Such aggression may serve as
punishment sensu Clutton-Brock & Parker (1995)
because it may alter the target’s (blenny) future
behaviour to the benefit of the punisher (the fish
that was bitten). In contrast to a cooperative context,
punishing in the blenny system cannot cause the
target to behave more cooperatively in the future
but punishment could be beneficial if it causes the
blenny to attack other individuals.
Victim species differ with respect to two parame-
ters that could have important effects on game struc-
ture and hence the probability of aggressive
responses. First, some victim species are resident
within a blenny’s territory and hence experience an
enforced repeated game structure: they could be at
permanent risk of being bitten by the blenny. In
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contrast, visitor species have large home ranges and
can in principle avoid a blenny by avoiding its terri-
tory. Second, local abundance varies greatly between
species and sometimes also within species, ranging
from one individual to hundreds. Both theory and
experiments on humans propose that the efficiency
of punishment relies on repeated interactions (Clut-
ton-Brock & Parker 1995; Ga¨chter et al. 2008).
Therefore, we predicted that residents are more
likely to respond aggressively to blennies than visi-
tors. With respect to group size, we wanted to inves-
tigate whether aggression could be costly (i.e.
reducing the direct fitness of the chaser) in larger
groups. While the costs of chasing are presumably
independent of group size, the benefits of chasing a
blenny may well be reduced in larger groups: in
larger groups it is more likely that a blenny will bite
another group member if it decides to attack the
same victim species again despite having been
chased during its last encounter. Furthermore, if the
blenny switches to a different victim species in
response to victim aggression, all look-alikes (con-
specifics) would benefit while only the chasing indi-
vidual incurs the cost of chasing. In this scenario,
the chasing individual would produce a public good.
If chasing does become costly in larger groups we
predicted that victim aggression should be absent in
large groups. In contrast, if chasing is inherently
self-serving, we predicted an absence of or at best a
weak negative correlation between local abundance
of victims and chasing of the blenny.
Methods
Study Site
All original data presented here were collected in
Sep. to Nov. 2002 at Ras Mohammed National Park
in Sinai, Egypt. The study site was at Mersa Bareika
(2747¢20.5¢¢N, 3413¢28.7¢¢E), a bay that is well
protected against surge. In this area, incoming sand
through wadis led to the formation of patch reefs
that are separated from each other by sand. Observa-
tions took place at 12 different reef patches. All of
these reef patches were small (estimated size
between 3.5 and 30 m3) and located in shallow
water (depth between 1.5 and 9 m).
Study Species
The two species of blennies studied, two Plagiotremus
rhinorhynchus and 10 P. tapeinosoma, occur in the
tropical Indo-West and Central Pacific and are found
on coral reefs and lagoons at depths from 1 to 40 m.
At most reef patches, only one blenny was present
while at the two largest blocks several blennies were
present but we could focus on one individual
because of their territoriality. Both blenny species
are lepidophagous (scale eating) parasites that attack
other fish to forage. Usually they sneak up on their
victims from behind and bite off small chunks of
skin, mucous and scales (Smith-Vaniz 1976; Johnson
& Hull 2006). Normally they stop their biting
attempts as soon as they are noticed (if their victims
turn around, pers. obs). One of the common names
of P. tapeinosoma, ‘Hit and Run Blenny’, describes
the typical feeding behaviour of both species that
comprises a rapid attack followed by a quick retreat
to safety (Johnson & Hull 2006). Blennies follow this
scheme independently of the reaction of the victim.
Only in less than 1% of our observations was a vic-
tim bitten twice without any retreat of the blenny
between bites.
With respect to victim species, we obtained data
on 32 non-predatory resident species (‘residents’)
and on 29 non-predatory visiting species (‘visitors’),
following the list of Bshary (2001). Resident species
live permanently at the same reef patch, whereas
visitors cross between reef patches and stay only for
short periods at any one. The most abundant resi-
dent species Pseudanthias squamipinnis is sexually
dimorphic. The data for males and females were
used separately, increasing the n for residents to 33.
We excluded predatory species because they have
the additional option to try to eat a blenny rather
than just chasing it, which makes their actions diffi-
cult to compare with non-predatory victims. In addi-
tion, we excluded non-predatory species that could
not be classified clearly as either resident or visitor
(‘facultative visitors’, see Bshary 2001) to avoid any
confounding effects of this ambiguity.
Data Collection
Observations were carried out using scuba equip-
ment and sitting on the surrounding sand 2–3 m in
front of a reef patch with a blenny present. Obser-
vations lasting 60 min were evenly spread over the
day and no blenny was observed more than once
on the same day. Each of the three observers
visited each reef patch twice at different times of
day. Thus, a total of 6 h of observations are avail-
able for each blenny adding up to a total of 72 h of
observations.
All interactions between the blenny and another
fish were first observed over the entire duration, and
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immediately afterwards, the following data was
noted on a Plexiglas plate:
1. Victim species. Species were determined accord-
ing to Randall (1983).
2. Length of victim. The total length of the individ-
ual was estimated to the nearest cm by comparison
with a reference measuring stick.
3. Sex of victim species (in sexually dimorphic
species).
4. Type of interaction:
– unprovoked aggression by the ‘victim’;
– biting attempt followed by a non-aggressive
response of the victim’
– biting attempt followed by aggressive response
of the victim;
– bite followed by a non-aggressive response of
the victim;
– bite followed by aggressive response of the
victim.
Aggression by the victim was scored if it acceler-
ated towards the blenny, usually evoking flight
behaviour by the blenny. We scored ‘unprovoked
aggression’ if a fish chased a blenny passing in front
and hence not obviously intent on attacking the
chaser. We scored a biting attempt if a blenny
approached a fish from behind in a characteristic
‘stop and go’ manner, which also proceeds successful
biting attempts (Smith-Vaniz 1976). We scored
‘aggressive response’ if the potential or real victim
turned round and swam towards the blenny. A
‘non-aggressive response’ was scored if the potential
or real victim swam away from the blenny or did
not move at all.
In separate dives, we counted the number of indi-
viduals per resident species on each reef patch. For
up to 10 individuals, we counted exact numbers,
while we used 5 unit categories for up to 50 individ-
uals and 10 unit categories for estimations of local
abundance above 50 individuals.
Data Analysis
We ran separate analyses for ‘unprovoked aggres-
sion’, aggression in response to biting attempts, and
aggression in response to biting. For analyses of
unprovoked aggression, we calculated the percent-
age of apparently unprovoked chasing relative to all
observed chasing events. For the other two forms
of aggression, we calculated the percentage of
aggressive responses to biting attempts as n aggres-
sive responses ⁄biting attempts · 100, and the
percentage of aggressive responses to biting was cal-
culated as n aggressive responses to biting ⁄ all
bites · 100. Species values were obtained by first
calculating for every type of aggression one mean
value per species per reef patch. These values were
used to calculate one mean value per species. The
species values were then used to compare aggres-
sion between residents and visitors, and to correlate
aggression with our median values of group size.
Not all species were observed both in the ‘attempt-
ing to bite’ and ‘successful bite’ situations, which
explains the variation in sample sizes between the
analyses.
For a within species correlation between group
size and aggression, we focussed on the most abun-
dant victim species, Pseudanthias squamipinnis. This
species is sexually dimorphic so we had local abun-
dance and aggression data for both males and
females. For the analysis, we generated the category
‘general aggression’ as the percentage of aggressive
behaviours by victims divided by all interactions in
order to have a reasonable sample size.
Finally, we ran a series of control analyses to
explore the effects of potentially confounding
variables like body size and territoriality. Visiting
species are on average larger than resident species
(Bshary 2001), whereas resident species are more
likely to be territorial. To control for size effects, we
carried out one analysis in which we only consid-
ered species of 10–15 cm mean total length, and
another analysis in which we calculated the corre-
lation between body size and aggression in resident
species only. To control for effects of territoriality,
we identified the following ten resident species as
non-territorial (typically shoaling) and asked how
they would compare to visitor species with respect
to aggression: Adioryx diadema, Myripristis murdjan,
Pseudanthias squamipinnis, P. taeniatus, Chromis ternat-
ensis, C. dimidiata, C. caerulea, Cheilodipterus lineatus,
Neopomacentrus miryae and Amblyglyphidodon leucogaster.
We did not run analyses that control for phylog-
eny. A phylogenetic tree that includes most victim
species shows that while resident species and visitor
species tend to group in clades, these clades are
quite randomly distributed over the phylogeny and
hence do not cause systematic errors (Bshary
2001).
All data were analysed using SPSS 17.0 applying
only non-parametric statistics. All p-values are two
tailed. When we tested whether the parameter ‘resi-
dent ⁄visitor’ and or the parameter ‘local abundance’
had any effect on the probability of aggression, we
had three behaviours (unprovoked aggression,
aggression in response to biting attempt, and aggres-
sion in response to bites) that could potentially yield
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significant results. We therefore had to adjust the
alpha level with the sequential Bonferroni test (Rice
1989). In this method, the original a-level (0.05) is
divided by n tests to be conducted to obtain the first
a¢. If one p-value is below the a¢ level, this result is
accepted as significant and a new a¢¢ is calculated by
dividing 0.05 by n tests )1. This procedure is
repeated until all p-values fail to be below the corre-
sponding critical a-level, and are hence considered
to be non-significant.
Results
General Information
In total, 1932 interactions between blennies and
their victims from the 12 reef blocks were used in
the analysis. In 1200 cases (62.11%), the victim spe-
cies showed aggressive behaviour. As victim behav-
iour towards the two P. rhinorhynchus individuals
was within the range of values for P. tapeinosoma
individuals we analysed the data without distin-
guishing between the blenny species.
Comparison Between Residents and Visitors
Resident species showed significantly more aggres-
sive behaviour in all categories of interaction when
the sequential Bonferroni technique was applied
(Mann–Whitney U-tests, initial a¢ = 0.017; unpro-
voked aggression: n residents = 33, n visitors = 29,
z = )3.822, p < 0.001; aggression in response to bit-
ing attempts: n residents = 24, n visitors = 15,
z = )3.408, p = 0.001; aggression in response to
bites: n residents = 27, n visitors = 27, z = )4.686,
p < 0.001, Fig. 1).
Potentially Confounding Variables
The differences in aggressive behaviour towards
blennies between residents and visitors largely per-
sisted when only species of similar sizes (10–15 cm)
were considered for the analysis (U-tests, unpro-
voked aggression: n residents = 10, n visitors = 9,
z = )1.870, p = 0.061, aggression in response to bit-
ing attempts: n residents = 8, n visitors = 5, z =
)3.029, p = 0.002; aggression in response to bites: n
residents = 7, n visitors = 8, z = )3.350, p = 0.001).
In addition, there are consistent positive correlations
between resident body size and aggressive behaviour
although the correlation is not significant for unpro-
voked aggression (Spearman correlations, unpro-
voked: n = 33, rs: 0.234, p = 0,190; biting attempts:
n = 24, rs: 0.595, p = 0.002; bites: n = 27, rs: 0.441,
p = 0.021).
The differences between residents and visitors per-
sisted when only the ten non-territorial resident spe-
cies were considered for the comparisons (U-tests,
initial a¢ = 0.017; unprovoked aggression: n resi-
dents = 10, n visitors = 29, z = ¢2.636, p = 0.008,
aggression in response to biting attempts: n resi-
dents = 10, n visitors = 15, z = ¢2.237, p = 0.025
aggression in response to bites: n residents = 10, n
visitors = 27, z = )3.545, p < 0.001).
Density Dependence of Aggression in Resident
Species
In all three categories, the median abundance of spe-
cies was negatively correlated with species aggression
when the sequential Bonferroni technique was
applied (Spearman correlations, initial a¢ = 0.017;
unprovoked aggression: n = 33, rs = )0.397, p =
0.022; response to attempt: n = 24, rs = )0.491,
p = 0.015; response to bite: n = 27, rs = )0.470, p =
0.013, Fig. 2a–c).
Density Dependence of Aggression in Pseudanthias
squamipinnis
There were marginally significant negative correla-
tions between group size and ‘general aggression’
against blennies in both sexes (Spearman correla-
tion, P. squamipinnis, a¢ = 0.025; females: n = 12,
rs = )0.581, p = 0.047; males: n = 11, rs = )0.661,
p = 0.027, Fig. 3).
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Fig. 1: Comparison of occurrences of three types of aggressive
behaviour (unprovoked aggression, aggression in response to biting
attempts and aggression in response to bites) between resident and
visiting victim species. Medians are represented with the 25 and 75
percentiles. Sample sizes per category for residents: 33, 24 and 27,
respectively. Sample sizes for visitors: 29, 15 and 27, respectively.
Resident victims show significantly higher levels of aggression in all
three comparisons.
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Correlations Between the Three Measures of
Aggression
We only calculated correlations for resident species
because of the absence of aggressive behaviour in
visiting species. There was a significant positive cor-
relation between the aggressive response to bites and
to biting attempts (Spearman correlation, initial
a) = 0.017, rs = 0.788, n = 22, p < 0.001). In con-
trast, unprovoked aggression showed no correlation
with the other two types of aggression (Spearman
correlations, unprovoked aggression vs. aggression
following attempts: rs = 0.172, n = 24, p = 0.422;
unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following bites:
rs = 0.186, n = 27, p = 0.352). A similar pattern
emerged in the within species correlations for male
Pseudanthias squamipinnis. There was a non-signifi-
cant but very positive correlation between the
aggressive response to bites and to biting attempts
(Spearman correlation, rs = 0.731, n = 7, p = 0.062),
while unprovoked aggression yielded non-significant
but negative correlations with the other two types of
aggression (Spearman correlations, unprovoked
aggression vs. aggression following attempts:
rs = )0.152, n = 8, p = 0.719; unprovoked aggres-
sion vs. aggression following bites: rs = )0.317,
n = 8, p = 0.444). In female P. squamipinnis all corre-
lations between the three types of aggressive
responses were far from being significant (Spearman
correlations, aggression following biting attempts vs.
aggressive response to bites: rs = 0.309, n = 11,
p = 0.355, unprovoked aggression vs. aggression
following attempts: rs = 0.273, n = 11, p = 0.417;
unprovoked aggression vs. aggression following bites:
rs = )0.118, n = 11, p = 0.729).
Discussion
We asked two principal questions about the interac-
tions between blennies and their victims. First,
whether any variation between species’ probability
to chase blennies can be explained by the distinction
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Fig. 2: Correlations between the resident species’ local abundance
(median number of individuals at a patch) and aggression towards
blennies. Each dot represents the mean value for one species. (a)
Spontaneous aggression relative to all aggressive acts towards blen-
nies (n = 33 species); (b) aggression in response to a blenny’s
approach (n = 24 species); (c) aggression in response to a blenny’s
bite (n = 27 species). All correlations are significantly negative.
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Fig. 3: Correlation between local abundance and aggressive behav-
iours towards blennies in 11 male and 12 female Pseudanthias
squamipinnis shoals. Each shoal is represented by one dot. The corre-
lations are marginally significant at the 0.025 level (because of Bonfer-
roni correction).
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between resident victims that experience an
enforced repeated game structure, and visiting vic-
tims that can in principle avoid repeated interactions
with a blenny. Second, whether the probability of
victim aggression is linked to variation in the local
abundance of species, where high abundance may
cause aggression to become costly. Our results show
that both parameters are important.
Enforced Repeated Game Structure
Resident species were consistently more likely than
visitors to aggress blennies after being bitten, in
response to an approach and without provocation.
The differences between residents and visitors largely
persisted when we controlled for size and territorial-
ity. Visitors not only fled after an attack but typically
left the reef patch (Bshary, A. & Bshary, R., pers.
obs.). Thus, they effectively excluded the possibility
of another interaction in the near future, an option
that resident species lack. The results thus corre-
spond very well to the behaviour of the same species
during cleaning interactions with the cleaner wrasse
Labroides dimidiatus, where residents are likely to
punish cleaners for taking bites of mucus [which
Bshary (2001) defined as cheating behaviour] while
visiting clients are likely to swim off instead (Bshary
& Grutter 2002; Bshary & Scha¨ffer 2002). It could
therefore be that the responses to cleaners and
sabre-tooth blennies co-evolved or that the reactions
to one are because of selection on the reaction to the
other. This could be tested by exposing Caribbean
fishes to sabre-tooth blennies. Caribbean fishes are
not exposed to such parasites and they do not punish
or switch cleaning station in interactions with clean-
ing gobies of the genus Elacatinus (Soares et al.
2008a) even although these gobies sometimes cheat
as well (Soares et al. 2008b). With respect to the cur-
rent study, we propose that an enforced repeated
game structure caused the evolution of aggression
towards blennies in resident species. This hypothesis
should be tested in the future by testing whether
aggression functions as punishment by reducing the
probability of future attacks. Currently, it is clear
that victim aggression does not yield immediate ben-
efits as blennies very rarely bite twice in one attack
(observed only 10 times in this study) but instead
retreat immediately after one bite. Therefore, aggres-
sion is not necessary to make the blenny swim away.
While there are currently few examples of punish-
ment in animals other than humans, it has already
been shown that the very same victim fish species
use punishment successfully to increase service
quality by cleaner wrasse (Bshary 2002; Bshary &
Grutter 2005).
Alternative explanations for the aggressive behav-
iour of residents seem to be unlikely: aggression can-
not be a direct response to pain because if this was
the case then both resident and visitor species
should show aggressive behaviour after painful
attacks. While smaller fish might find attacks more
painful than large fish, we found that the difference
between residents and visitors in reaction to bites
persisted when we controlled for size. We also found
that larger residents tended to be more aggressive to
blennies than small residents, while we would
expect the opposite if aggression was a direct
response to pain, since bites should be more painful
to smaller fish. Also, aggression does not seem to be
a by-product of territoriality as non-territorial resi-
dent species were still more aggressive towards blen-
nies than visitors were.
Despite the fact that visitors can avoid repeated
interactions with blennies, it seems unlikely that
they will never return again to a reef patch where
they have been bitten. Thus, it appears that visitors
as well as residents may experience several interac-
tions with any blenny within their home ranges.
Nevertheless, encounter rates with visitors for any
particular blenny will be much lower than for the
blenny’s resident victims. Long time intervals
between subsequent interactions may impose cogni-
tive constraints on both blenny and victim, turning
their repeated interactions into functionally one-off
interactions. Models of reciprocity and punishment
demonstrate that remembering the partner’s last
behaviour is essential for punishment to work
(Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). In contrast, punish-
ment in one-off interactions or functionally one-off
interactions may only work if kin selection between
the victim and other potential victims is invoked
(Gardner & West 2004). In the blenny-visitor case,
relatives of the chasing victim would have to benefit
from a temporarily reduced attack probability.
However, such a scenario is unlikely to apply to reef
fishes because pelagic egg and ⁄or larval stages
should prevent any kin structure in shoals, as
demonstrated in Pseudanthias squamipinnis (Avise &
Shapiro 1986).
Local Abundance ⁄Density Dependence
The negative correlations of aggression with group
size both on the inter-specific and the intra-specific
level can be interpreted in two ways. First, with
increasing group size each individual experiences
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less pressure from the blenny and hence the
potential benefits of chasing diminish with increas-
ing group size. In this scenario, the decision to chase
or not is unaffected by its consequences on the fit-
ness of conspecifics. Second, it could be that aggres-
sion by victims causes blennies to switch to other
victim species for future attacks. In that case, chasing
would produce a public good to all look-alikes. As
group size increases, the personal benefits for the
chasing individual would be reduced while the costs
remain constant, and chasing would hence become
less likely in larger groups. To distinguish between
the two potential explanations, future studies that
focus on the foraging strategies of the blennies are
necessary.
An interesting result was that high levels of
aggression were maintained in species that occurred
in high densities of around 40–60 individuals per
reef patch. This result provides evidence against the
possibility that reef fish face a basic tragedy of the
commons problem (Hardin 1968) when chasing a
blenny. In the basic tragedy of the commons sce-
nario, contributions to a public good are invariably
under negative selection for such large group sizes
unless additional parameters are included, such as
strong between-group competition (Boyd et al. 2003;
Gintis et al. 2003) or the possibility of gaining social
prestige which is useful in other situations (Nowak
& Sigmund 1998; Milinski et al. 2002). Our results
fit with a scenario where a contributor gets a higher
share of the benefits it generates than other group
members (Sherratt et al. 2009). Indeed, individuals
may gain an extra personal benefit from chasing a
blenny in two possible and not mutually exclusive
ways. First, aggression leads to the blenny attacking
elsewhere in the future. This potential benefit would
require a degree of site fidelity of the victim at least
over short time periods. Second, aggression makes
the blenny focus on other individuals. This would
require individual recognition of potential victims by
the blenny. Evidence for individual recognition is
widespread for fishes (Griffiths & Ward 2006) and
includes individual recognition of members of other
species (Tebbich et al. 2002), but individual recogni-
tion in blennies has yet to be tested.
Correlation Between the Three Forms of Aggression
Unprovoked aggression is not correlated to the other
two types of aggression, with some of the correlation
coefficients even yielding negative tendencies. We
explored some potentially confounding factors such
as territoriality and hiding in crevices and found no
influence of these (results not shown). We do not
know in what way unprovoked aggressive behaviour
is different from aggression towards a stalking or bit-
ing blenny. As all three forms of aggression are simi-
larly correlated with an enforced repeated game
structure and with local abundance one would
expect a common cause. In the absence of indications
explaining why unprovoked aggression is different,
future studies should keep the separation between
the various situations of aggression towards blennies.
Conclusions and Outlook
Our results provide evidence that enforced repeated
game structure is necessary for the evolution of
aggression towards a cheater, although the benefits
of such aggression remain to be evaluated. In addi-
tion, blenny–victim interactions provide a setting in
which the effect of the number of partners on the
level of aggression towards a shared enemy can be
studied. The observation that even members of large
groups chase blennies with about 50% probability is
interesting because the result suggests that the puta-
tive benefits of punishment are not dissolved in large
groups, while public goods may potentially emerge
in this setting. As a next step, two important
hypotheses have to be tested: that aggression
towards a blenny functions as punishment and that
punishment in larger groups constitutes a public
good.
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